# SCALING CODE ANALYSIS ACROSS AN ENTERPRISE

FLORIAN NOEDING

PRINCIPAL SECURITY ARCHITECT @ ADOBE

## ABOUT ME

- Principal Security Architect @ Adobe
   Software Engineer → Security Researcher
   → Security Strategy
- Fun fact: I bake my own German style bread recipe on my blog <a href="https://florian.noeding.com">https://florian.noeding.com</a>





# SECRETS IN SOURCE CODE (SISC)

 Detect credentials in source code or repositories

```
import requests

token = '44AE90194399'


url = 'https://example.com/api'

headers = {
    'Authorization': f'Bearer {bearer_token}'
}

response = requests.get(url, headers=headers)
```

# SOFTWARE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS (SCA)

- Create inventory of 3<sup>rd</sup> party dependencies
- Enables look-up of CVEs affecting these libraries



https://xkcd.com/2347/

# STATIC APPLICATION SECURITY TESTING (SAST)

- Looks for vulnerable code patterns or dataflows
- Identifies 1<sup>st</sup> party vulnerabilities



## CHALLENGE

- Hundreds of Products across desktop, mobile, web, ...
- Diverse tech stacks
  - 12 programming languages make up 80% of our code
  - Many more frameworks
- Multiple SCMs
- 100k+ repositories as primary scope
- On average 30k scan events per day



### DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Great Developer Experience as the key goal to ensure acceptance:

- Integrate deeply into developer workflow
- Provide timely, relevant and actionable feedback (shift-left!)
- Carefully balance noise and risk reduction
- Single pane of glass into source code related findings

Goal: pragmatic risk reduction instead of zero known vulnerabilities.

# PRIMARY PROCESS



Security as Code merge

write code

test locally

Adversary Intelligence

•••••••



Scan requested

Feedback <= 5 min + build gather feedback commit & push

create pull request

# FEEDBACK LOOPS

Inline feedback on pull requests

Findings in changed files only (important!), very few exceptions

Metrics driven security campaigns

only a few specific risks

Custom dashboard

All findings on any branch

Challenge: not yet widely adopted by engineers

Ticketing for enforcement

Critical risks only

Challenge: Attribution to project often non-trivial


# SCAN TOOL SELECTION

Easy to rollout Finds important vulnerabilities


Developer friendly output

Fast enough

Customizable



# ROLLOUT



# OUTCOMES 2023

# 300,000 findings fixed

nudging only – zero enforcement



# ADVERSARY MODEL

HIGHLY SIMPLIFIED

### Security Researchers

- Various motivations
- generally friendly
- no 0-day leaks

#### **eCriminals**

- Often financially motivated
- Repeatable, scalable exploitation

→ Fix easy to exploit or widely deployed vulnerabilities first

#### Nation States

- Operations with targeted outcomes
- Hard to predict

→ Defense in depth

→ Use to identify gaps in program

# SISC - RISK REDUCTION STRATEGY

MOST BREACHES INVOLVE LEAKED OR STOLEN CREDENTIALS

Public and widely shared internal repos

Easy to abuse, particularly cloud credentials

Active and long-lived

Everything else

• consider accepting revoked credentials in historical commits

# SCA - RISK REDUCTION STRATEGY

MANY BREACHES START WITH AN OUT-OF-DATE SYSTEM

#### Exploited in the Wild

• CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) catalog

#### **Exploit Available**

• Various Intelligence Feeds

#### Likely to be exploited

• First's Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

#### Everything else

• Severity (CVSS), Customer & Compliance Expectations

#### Future:

- Filter out unreachable CVEs
- Use contextual data

#### **SBOM Transparency:**

→ Fix based on CVSS

# SAST - RISK REDUCTION STRATEGY

OPEN PROBLEM - RELYING ON SAST VENDOR'S SCORES

Exploited in the Wild

**Exploit Available** 

Likely to be exploited

Everything else

#### Future:

• CWE ⇔ TTP mapping?

Let me know if you've solved this!

# UNIFIED RISK PRIORITIZATION

SIMPLIFIED MODEL

SCA – Exploited in the wild (KEV)

SISC – Critical secrets

SCA – Likely to be exploited (EPSS)

Everything else



# SHIFTING LEFT — 6 BUCKETS OF RISK

Found Prevented Automatically Secure by SCA, SAST design & default DAST, Fuzzing, Paved paths

Found Manually pen tests, red team security reviews, threat modeling

Found Externally

**Bug Bounty** 

Unfound

**Exploited** 

incidents

Fixing root causes > Fixing symptoms

Hazard elimination > Hazard remediation

# META FEEDBACK LOOP

Investments Found Found Found Unfound Exploited Prevented Automatically Manually Externally Any finding indicates a gap further left Program Gaps Adversary Security Strategy Intel **Business** Strategy

# **QUESTIONS?**

#### Key Takeaways:


- Focus on great DevEx talk to them!
- Feedback loop design is crucial
- Fix things that matter
  - SCA: Consider using EPSS
  - SAST: target root causes, not symptoms



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# BACKUP SLIDES



# KODIAK INTERNALS

#### Trigger Scan

Pull Request created / updated



#### Update Code Store

• Fetch latest code revision



#### Find Defects

• Execute scan engines in parallel



#### Post-process Findings

- Denoise findings
- Deduplicate findings
- Risk scoring
- ..

#### Share Feedback

- Inline
- Dashboard
- •

# LINKS

- EPSS: <a href="https://www.first.org/epss/">https://www.first.org/epss/</a>
- KEV: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog">https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog</a>
- 6 buckets of risk: <a href="http://collingreene.com/6">http://collingreene.com/6</a> buckets of prodsec.html
- My blog: <a href="https://florian.noeding.com">https://florian.noeding.com</a>
- More about Kodiak: <a href="https://blog.developer.adobe.com/project-kodiak-shifting-application-security-left-at-enterprise-scale-55f5453d1966">https://blog.developer.adobe.com/project-kodiak-shifting-application-security-left-at-enterprise-scale-55f5453d1966</a>